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Abstract
Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual
perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and approximately optimal
mechanisms. This paper applies this same methodology to a close cousin of traditional mechanism
design, onewhich shares conceptual and technical elements with its moremature relative: the burgeoning
field of persuasion. The dual perspective permits us to analyze optimal persuasion schemes both in
settings which have been analyzed in prior work, as well as for natural generalizations which we are the
first to explore in depth. Most notably, we permit combining persuasion policies with payments, which
serve to augment the persuasion power of the scheme. In both single and multi-receiver settings, as well
as under a variety of constraints on payments, we employ duality to obtain structural insights, as well as
tractable and simple characterizations of optimal policies.
1 Introduction
There are two primary ways of influencing the actions of strategic agents: through providing incentives and
through influencing beliefs. The former is the domain of traditional mechanism design, and involves the
promise of payments or goods contingent on behavior. The latter is the domain of information design, or
persuasion, and involves the selective provision of information pertaining to the payoffs and costs of various
actions. There are striking similarities and parallels between the two worlds, both in terms of the domains in
which they are studied — for example in auctions [Emek et al., 2014; Dughmi et al., 2014; Daskalakis et al.,
2016] and routing [Bhaskar et al., 2016] — as well in the mathematical models and techniques used to char-
acterize and compute optimal policies (e.g. [Dughmi and Xu, 2016, 2017; Kolotilin et al., 2017]). Combin-
ing the approaches and techniques of mechanism design and persuasion leads to a more powerful toolkit for
the design of economic systems, and this paper takes a step in that direction.
We work with two models of persuasion: the Bayesian Persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow
[2011], and the multi-receiver private Bayesian persuasion model of Arieli and Babichenko [2019] (further
developed in Babichenko and Barman [2017] and Dughmi and Xu [2017]) which we generalize to allow
externalities. In the spirit of mechanism design and principal-agent problems, we generalize both models
by permitting payments, which serve as additional incentive for the receiver(s) of information to behave in
accordance with the wishes of the sender (principal).
We then explore these models through the lens of Lagrangian duality, much in the spirit of the literature
applying duality to auction theory and Bayesian mechanism design. In particular, we vary constraints on
the payments (arbitrary, nonnegative, budget balanced) and the information/reward structure (symmetric vs
asymmetric actions), and derive canonical and/or tractable optimal policies through duality.
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The Persuasion Models. In the Bayesian persuasion model, there is a receiver who must select one of
a number of actions, and a sender looking to influence the receiver’s choice in order to maximize her own
expected payoff. We adopt the perspective of the sender. A state of nature, drawn from a common knowledge
prior distribution, determines the payoff of each action to each of the sender and the receiver. The sender has
an informational advantage over the receiver: access to the realization of the state of nature. The problem
facing the sender is that of computing and committing to the optimal signaling scheme: a randomized map
from states of nature to signals. Once the state is drawn by nature, the signaling scheme is invoked and
the corresponding signal is sent to the receiver; she then updates her prior belief and chooses the action
maximizing her expected payoff. The multi-receiver private Bayesian persuasion model generalizes the
previous model to multiple receivers. There is still a common knowledge prior distribution over states of
nature, and a single sender with an informational advantage. We restrict attention to the special case of two
actions {0, 1} for each receiver. The state of nature now determines a set function for the sender and a set
function for each of the receivers: each set function maps the set of receivers taking action 1 to a payoff. A
signaling scheme now is a randomized map from states of nature to a signal for each receiver.
In both models, a simple revelation principle style argument shows that it suffices to restrict attention to
schemes which are direct and persuasive (see e.g. Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011]; Arieli and Babichenko
[2019]). A direct scheme is one in which signals correspond to action recommendations. Such a scheme is
persuasive if it is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for each receiver to follow the recommendation.
Adding Payments. We augment each model by allowing a special form of payment contract. In addition
to committing to a direct signaling scheme, the sender also commits to a payment p(i) for each action i. If
the signaling scheme recommends action i, and the receiver follows the recommendation, she is then paid
p(i) by the sender (or pays the sender −p(i) if p(i) < 0). If the receiver deviates from the scheme’s recom-
mendation, no payment is exchanged. Since payments are exchanged only when the receiver follows the
recommendation, nonnegative payments can be viewed as augmenting the “persuasiveness” of the signaling
scheme. Negative payments are less natural, although their consideration will be technically instructive.
We distinguish three classes of payment contracts: unrestricted (allowing arbitrary positive and negative
payments), nonnegative, and budget balanced. For the latter, the sender’s expected payment should be zero
over states of nature and randomness in the signaling scheme, assuming the receiver(s) follow the recom-
mendations of the scheme. Independent to our work, Li [2017] also considers adding payments to Bayesian
persuasion. They analyze a special case of Bayesian persuasion with two states of nature, and examine how
adding a payment contract influences the optimal policy in that scenario. Our approach diverges from this
work by considering more general settings of Bayesian persuasion and various classes of payment contracts.
Duality as a Unifying Lens. Persuasion and auction design share striking parallels. Indeed, both are eco-
nomic design problems in which the outputs — recommendation(s) in the case of persuasion and allocations
of goods in the case of an auction — are subjected to incentive constraints which at the surface appear quite
similar in the two settings. This is made explicit by Dughmi and Xu [2016], who draw an analogy between
persuasion and single-item auctions: actions are analogous to bidders, and recommending an action is analo-
gous to allocating the item. Through this analogy, they were able to leverage techniques from auction theory
— in particular Border’s theorem [Border, 1991] — to characterize and compute optimal signaling schemes
for Bayesian persuasion when action payoffs are i.i.d. This analogy is imperfect, however, as illustrated by
the impossibility result of Dughmi and Xu [2016] for independent non-identical action payoffs, contrasting
the tractability of single-item auctions with independent bidders.
Despite being imperfect, however, this similarity is suggestive: if a Border’s theorem based approach of
optimization of interim rules can be applied to persuasion, why not the “virtual value” approach of Myerson
[1981] as well? Myerson’s approach can be viewed through the more general lens of Lagrangian duality, in
particular as a consequence of Lagrangifying the incentive constraints. The duality-based approach has been
applied to much more general mechanism design settings, producing (often approximate) generalizations of
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Myerson’s virtual-value characterization which have led to simple and approximately optimal mechanisms
in a number of multi-parameter settings (e.g. Cai et al. [2016]; Eden et al. [2017a,b]; Brustle et al. [2017];
Fu et al. [2018]; Liu and Psomas [2018]; Cai and Zhao [2017]; Haghpanah and Hartline [2015], and classic
results such as Rochet and Choné [1998]). It is therefore natural that we embark on the same exploration for
persuasion, as well as for models (such as ours) which combine the approaches of persuasion and mechanism
design. As a best case scenario, we can hope for “simple” characterizations of optimal or near-optimal
schemes, akin to those derived from duality in mechanism design. Particularly attractive are “canonical”
characterizations which depend minimally on the details of the instance at hand.
Our Results. In Section 3, we apply Lagrangian duality to Bayesian persuasion, and derive some ele-
mentary properties of the primal/dual pair which enable our results to follow. Our first main result is in
Section 5, and concerns (single-receiver) Bayesian persuasion with a prior distribution which is symmetric
across n actions1, and no payments are allowed. We show that a single dual variable naturally interpolates
between two extreme schemes: at one extreme (λ equals zero) we get the (non-persuasive) scheme which
always recommends the sender’s ex-post preferred action, at the other extreme (λ very large) we get the
(persuasive) scheme which recommends the receiver’s ex-post preferred action. Intermediate values of λ
yield schemes which point-wise optimize the sender payoff plus nλ times the receiver’s payoff. Moreover,
there is a threshold λ∗ below which the induced scheme is non-persuasive, and above which the scheme is
persuasive. This λ∗ induces the sender-optimal persuasive signaling scheme. This characterization is detail-
free, in the sense that it reduces the prior distribution to a relative weighting of receiver to sender payoff, in
particular the minimum necessary for persuasiveness. Furthermore, this optimal scheme is Pareto efficient
in a strong (ex-post) sense: for every state θ, no outcome Pareto dominates the one picked by the scheme.
In Section 6, we use duality to characterize Bayesian persuasion schemes with payments. When arbitrary
payments are allowed and the prior is symmetric, the optimal signaling scheme is canonical and does not
depend on the prior: it always (i.e. in every state of nature) recommends the action that maximizes the
sender utility plus n
n−1
times the receiver’s utility. Payments accompanying this scheme are computed easily
via a simple payment identity. Our main result in this section is a dichotomy for Bayesian persuasion with
a symmetric prior, but non-negative payments: the optimal scheme is either the same as the aforementioned
arbitrary-payment scheme (in the event that non-negative payments are needed), or else is the optimal no-
payment signaling scheme. Finally, with only two actions and an arbitrary prior, we show that when arbitrary
payments are allowed, the optimal scheme always recommends the action maximizing sender utility plus
twice receiver utility. Again, all of our optimal schemes are ex-post Pareto efficient. We note that the
strongest positive results of Dughmi and Xu [2016] (exact polynomial time solvability) hold in the setting
of i.i.d. actions. Our results therefore extend and simplify theirs, while lending further insight.
In Section 7, we turn our attention to a multi-receiver private persuasion model with externalities. Again,
we employ duality to analyze the optimal scheme in this setting. Our first main result shows that, when we
allow budget balanced payments, there exists an optimal scheme which is “simple” in the following sense:
It always recommends an action maximizing a weighted sum of sender utility and the receivers’ marginal
utility from following the recommendation of the scheme. The relative weighting is determined by a single
dual variable. This characterization is interesting when contrasted with the optimal no-payment scheme,
which is not as simple in general, and we show is sometimes strictly outperformed (in terms of sender
expected utility) by the optimal budget-balanced scheme. Our second main result is a generalization of an
algorithmic result of Dughmi and Xu [2017] to multi-receiver persuasion with positive externalities: when
no payments are allowed, and sender and receiver utility functions lie in some cone of set functions C, we
use duality to exhibit a polynomial time reduction from optimal signaling to the optimization problem for
set functions in C. Due to the lack of space, details of this last result are in Appendix B.
1We refer the reader to Dughmi [2017]; Dughmi and Xu [2016] for some natural examples of persuasion with symmetric actions.
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2 Preliminaries
Bayesian persuasion. Bayesian persuasion is a game between a sender, also termed as the principal, and
a receiver, also termed as the agent. There is also a set of possible states of nature Θ. The true state of nature
θ ∈ Θ is drawn from a prior distribution µθ, known to both the sender and the receiver. The receiver has a set
of possible actions [n] = {1, . . . , n} to pick. Based on the action i picked by the receiver and the true state of
nature θ, the sender and the receiver gain payoffs2, denoted by sθ(i) and rθ(i) respectively. In the Bayesian
persuasion game, the sender commits to a signaling scheme φ, where in general φ is a mapping from Θ to
distributions over possible signals, Σ. Then the sender observes θ ∼ µθ, and sends a signal σ ∈ Σ to the
receiver, where σ ∼ φθ for the observed θ. Given signal σ, the receiver updates her belief about the state of
nature θ, and selects an action ir that maximizes her expected payoff under this posterior distribution. In this
paper, without loss of generality, and by applying the revelation principle [Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011],
we focus on signaling schemes for which Σ = [n]. We use the notation φθ(i) to denote the probability that
the sender recommends action i conditioned on the state of nature being θ. A signaling scheme is said to
implement φθ, if it samples signal i ∼ φθ given the state of nature θ.
Persuasive signaling and optimal Bayesian persuasion. A signaling scheme is persuasive if the receiver
is best off following the sender’s recommendation, i.e. following the sender’s recommendation maximizes
the receiver’s expected payoff under the receiver’s posterior belief about the state of the nature (conditioned
on the received signal). In the optimal Bayesian persuasion problem, we wish to find, over all persuasive
schemes, the one that maximizes the sender’s expected payoff.
Action types. As typical in information structure design, we frequently think of each action as having a
“type” depending on the state of nature.3 That is, θ = [θ1, . . . , θn] is a vector in [m]
n, for some parameter
m. Action i has type θi, which completely determines the sender and receiver payoffs should action i be
selected, independent of θ−i. More clearly, there exist m pairs of payoffs (ξ
i
1
, ρi
1
), . . . , (ξim, ρ
i
m) such that
when the receiver selects action i with θi = j, ξ
i
j
is the payoff to the sender and ρi
j
is the payoff to the
receiver. Note that sθ(i) = ξ
i
θi
and rθ(i) = ρ
i
θi
, and for universality we stick to this notation (see Appendix C).
Distributions in this setting may be independent, if µθ = ×
i
µθi is a product distribution, where each µθi
is a distribution over [m]. Distributions in this setting may also be symmetric, if µθ is invariant under all
permutations. Distributions that are both independent and symmetric are i.i.d.
Bayesian persuasion with payments. In this paper, we introduce a natural model of payments into the
Bayesian persuasion problem. In addition to recommending an action i, the sender is allowed to “incen-
tivize” the receiver to take the recommendation with an additional payment p(i). Mathematically, it also
makes sense to consider when payments are allowed to be negative (which corresponds to the sender “charg-
ing” the receiver −p(i) in order to follow the recommendation). This certainly could be relevant for practice
(e.g. if the sender/receiver can commit to contracts), but the non-negative payment model is clearly more
natural. We study four different payment models: zero payments (i.e. classic Bayesian persuasion), non-
negative payments (i.e. when the sender cannot charge the receiver), budget-balanced payments (i.e. the
payment of the sender is zero in expectation) and general payments (i.e. payments are arbitrary real num-
bers). To unify the notation throughout the paper, we use P to denote the feasible set of payments, which
plays the role of a different polytope for each relevant payment model (note that in all four models P is
closed and convex). A signaling scheme is said to implement (φθ, p) if given the observed state of nature θ,
it samples i ∼ φθ and pays the receiver a (randomized) payment p(i). Throughout this paper, it will be much
more convenient to focus on specifying the expected payments for following the recommendation of action
i, P(i) ,
∑
θ∈Θ µθφθ(i)p(i) for any scheme. We similarly define the implementability of (φθ, P).
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2 We use the words “payoff" and “reward" interchangeably in this paper.
3 We refer the reader to Dughmi and Xu [2016] for a list examples of Bayesian persuasions and how types are defined in those.
4 It is also easy to see how to implement payments p(i) from P(i) and an implementation of φθ: for a given state θ ∈ Θ, sample
a payment
P(i)
φθ(i)
whenever signal i ∼ φθ is recommended.
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Payment identity and optimal payments. We conclude with an observation about Bayesian persuasion
with payments. Similar to auction design, there is a “payment identity” capturing which payments will make
an implementable signaling scheme persuasive. In contrast to auctions, however, it is easy to see that every
signaling scheme can be made persuasive with sufficiently high payments.
Observation 1. Let µθ be any distribution over states of nature, and φθ be any signaling scheme (not nec-
essarily persuasive). Then there exist thresholds T1, . . . , Tn such that (φθ, p) is persuasive if and only if
P(i) ≥ Ti for all i.
Proof. Let Xφ(i, j) be the receiver’s expected utility by taking action j when the scheme φθ recommends
action i. Define Ti = max j,i{Xφ(i, j) − Xφ(i, i)}. Therefore, Xφ(i, i) + Ti ≥ Xφ(i, j) for all j, and any scheme
that pays P(i) ≥ Ti is certainly persuasive when recommending i. Moreover, if P(i) < Ti, then there exists
some j s.t. Xφ(i, i) + P(i) < Xφ(i, j), and the scheme is not persuasive. 
Definition 1. We refer to the T1, . . . , Tn guaranteed in Observation 1 as the optimal payments for φ, and
max{0, T1}, . . . ,max{0, Tn} as the optimal non-negative payments for φ.
Bayesian persuasion with multiple agents, binary actions and externalities. In this paper, we formal-
ize a model with externalities, naturally extending the model introduced recently in Arieli and Babichenko
[2019] and Dughmi and Xu [2017] for private persuasion with no externalities. Consider the general setup
of Bayesian persuasion with one sender and N receivers, where each receiver can take either action 0 or
action 1. Using the revelation principle for Bayesian persuasion, we can restrict our attention to direct sig-
naling schemes, where a direct (randomized) scheme can be thought of as a mapping from Θ to distributions
over subsets of [N], indicating to which receivers action 1 is recommended. We denote such a scheme by
φθ(S ) for every θ ∈ Θ, S ⊆ [N]. Given the subset S of receivers taking action 1, let u
θ
i
(S ) be the payoff of
receiver i and f θ(S ) be sender’s payoff. We further assume that f θ(S ) is a monotone set function. We also
allow payments of the form {p(i)(a)}i∈[N],a∈{0,1}, where p
(i)(a) is the payment agent i receives by following
action a, if it is recommended. We occasionally use the notation gθ
i
(S ) , uθ
i
(S )−uθ
i
(S \ {i}), which are called
marginal utilities in this paper. For our computational results, we further assume positive externalities, i.e.
for every agent i, gθ
i
(S ) can only increase if agent j , i switches from action 0 to 1.
3 Lagrangian Duality and Bayesian persuasion
In this section, we create a unified analysis toolbox for various Bayesian persuasion problems through the
lens of LP duality. Specifically, we use Lagrangian duals to reveal the structures of the optimal signaling,
á la successful instances of a similar technique in Bayesian mechanism design [Cai et al., 2016]. As a
prerequisite, we heavily use linear programming techniques introduced in Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011],
and further improved in Dughmi and Xu [2016], and build a bedrock for the analyses in future sections.
3.1 LP for general Bayesian persuasion with payments
Linear programming formulations of Bayesian persuasion without payments have been introduced in numer-
ous prior works (e.g. Dughmi and Xu [2016]). We now modify the program slightly to capture payments,
by observing that whenever action i is recommended the receiver gets additional payoff p(i) and the sender
loses a payoff p(i). The following program solves the sender’s optimization problem.
max
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈[n]
µθφθ(i) (sθ(i) − p(i))
∑
θ∈Θ
µθφθ(i) (rθ(i) + p(i)) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
µθφθ(i)rθ( j), ∀i, j , i ∈ [n]
φθ ∈ ∆n, ∀θ ∈ Θ, and p ∈ P
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The first set of constraints, also called persuasiveness constraints, are similar to Incentive Compatibility
(IC) constraints from auction design, and ensure that the receiver is best off (in expectation) by following
the recommendation and paying the payment. The rest ensure that the scheme is in fact a valid distribution
over recommendations, and the payments are feasible. While not yet a linear program, the above program
can be made linear by a simple change of variables to expected payments P(i):5
max
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈[n] µθφθ(i)sθ(i) −
∑
i∈[n] P(i) (LP-General-with-Payments)
P(i) +
∑
θ∈Θ µθφθ(i)rθ(i) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ µθφθ(i)rθ( j), ∀i, j , i ∈ [n]
φθ ∈ ∆n, ∀θ ∈ Θ, and P ∈ P
where we abuse the notation by using P to denote the feasible polytope of average payments P.
3.2 The partial Lagrangian dual
One of the main tools we use in this paper is taking the partial Lagrangians of the linear programs of the
Bayesian persuasion problem. Basically, similar to Cai et al. [2016], we do not take a “complete dual” of
the LP formulation, instead “Lagrangifying” only the persuasiveness constraints, and leave all feasibility
constraints in the primal.6 To take the partial Lagrangians, we apply the method of Lagrangian multipliers
by (a) introducing dual variables λ(i, j) for every pair of actions i, j ∈ [n] with i , j, (b) multiplying the
persuasiveness constraints with duals λ(i, j), and (c) moving the persuasiveness constraints to the objective.
By rearranging the terms we have the following observation.
Observation 2. Assigning dual variables λ(i, j) to the persuasiveness constraint guaranteeing that the re-
ceiver prefers to take action i over action j when i is recommended gives the following partial Lagrangian.
Lλ(φ, P) =
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n]
µθφθ(i)
sθ(i) + rθ(i)
∑
j,i
λ(i, j) −
∑
j,i
λ(i, j)rθ( j)
 +
∑
i∈[n]
P(i)

∑
j,i
λ(i, j) − 1
 . (1)
We conclude by reminding the reader that the optimal signaling schemes and payments are solutions to the
following min-max programs by applying strong duality (D denotes the appropriate dual feasible polytope):
max
∀θ:φθ∈∆n,P∈P
(
min
λ∈D
Lλ(φ, P)
)
= min
λ∈D
(
max
∀θ:φθ∈∆n,P∈P
Lλ(φ, P)
)
. (2)
Definition 2 (Dual-adjusted receiver payoff ). For any assignment of dual variables λ ∈ D, define rλ
θ
(i) ,
rθ(i)
∑
j,i λ(i, j) −
∑
j,i λ(i, j)rθ( j).
We conclude by Proposition 1, which we repeatedly use in Sections 5, 6 and 7 to extract various proper-
ties of the corresponding optimal policy.
Proposition 1. [Strong Duality for Bayesian Persuasion] There exist dual variables λ(., .) such that the
optimal signaling scheme, for every state of nature θ, recommends the action maximizing the dual-adjusted
receiver payoff, i.e. sθ(i)+ r
λ
θ
(i). Moreover, if λ(i, j) > 0, then when action i is recommended, the receiver is
indifferent between following the recommendation and taking action j instead (Complementary Slackness).7
Proof. This is is an immediate consequence of strong duality, plus some observations about the structure
of the Bayesian Persuasion LP. Observe first that indeed Lλ(φ, P) =
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i) · (sθ(i) + r
λ
θ
(i)) +
5 Recall that P(i) =
∑
θ∈Θ µθφθ(i)p(i).
6 There are significant conceptual differences between “incentive constraints” in auction design and “persuasiveness con-
straints”. Some of these differences were briefly discussed in Section 1; we will highlight them further in future technical sections.
7 We will not actually make use of complementary slackness in this paper, but include it here for completeness.
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∑
i∈[n] P(i)(
∑
j,i λ(i, j) − 1). Now, consider the RHS of Equation 2. For given dual variables λ, observe
that the right-most term (depending on P) does not depend on φ at all. Observe that the remaining term
(
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i) · (sθ(i) + r
λ
θ
(i))) is trivial to optimize over all φ such that φθ ∈ ∆n for all θ ∈ Θ: simply
recommend the action maximizing sθ(i) + r
λ
θ
(i) for all θ ∈ Θ. Therefore, when λ are the optimal dual
variables, the optimal signaling scheme must recommend the action maximizing sθ(i) + r
λ
θ
(i) on all states of
nature. Complementary slackness follows immediately from strong duality. 
3.3 Exploiting symmetries
When viewing actions by their types (recall this means that we view states of nature as a profile [θ1, . . . , θn],
with each θi ∈ [m]), some of our results consider symmetric settings, where µθ1,...,θn = µθπ(1),...,θπ(n) for any per-
mutation π : [n] → [n]. It is well-known that symmetric LPs admit symmetric solutions (e.g. Herr and Bödi
[2009]), and this fact has indeed been exploited in prior work on signaling and auctions [Dughmi and Xu,
2016; Cai et al., 2012]. The proof of this is straight-forward, but we sketch it below (and provide a full proof
in Appendix A). First, we state clearly what we mean by symmetric solutions.
Definition 3. We say that a signaling scheme (φ, P) is symmetric if P(i) = P( j) for all i, j and for all
permutations π, we have φ[θ1,...,θn](i) = φ[θπ(1),...,θπ(n)](π
−1(i)) for all i, θ. We say that a dual solution λ is
symmetric if λ(i, j) = λ(k, ℓ) for all i, j, k, ℓ.
Proposition 2. Let µθ be a symmetric instance of Bayesian Persuasion, with any of the four referenced
constraints on payments (none, non-negative, budget-balanced, or arbitrary). Then there exists an optimal
symmetric primal and an optimal symmetric dual for µθ.
Proof sketch. The proof is essentially a formalization of the following intuition. First, if a scheme φ is
optimal and persuasive, and µθ is symmetric, then we can first “relabel” the actions according to any per-
mutation π before implementing φ, and it will still be optimal and persuasive. Second, any distribution over
optimal, persuasive schemes is still optimal and persuasive. And third, if we consider the scheme that ran-
domly samples a permutation π with which to relabel the actions before implementing φ, then this scheme
is symmetric. A full proof appears in Appendix A. 
With Proposition 2 in hand, we can now draw further conclusions regarding the format of the Lagrangian
function L in the special case that µθ is symmetric:
Corollary 1. When µθ is symmetric, there exists a constant λ such that the optimal scheme, on every state
of nature θ, selects an action i maximizing sθ(i) + nλrθ(i). Moreover, for the same λ and some constant C,
the Lagrangian takes the following form:
Lλ(φ, P) =
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n]
µθφθ(i) (sθ(i) + nλrθ(i)) +
∑
i∈[n]
P(i) ((n − 1)λ − 1) − λC.
Proof. Consider an optimal and symmetric dual solution, which is guaranteed to exist by Proposition 2, in
which λ(i, j) = λ for all i , j. Then we get the following simplified form for L:
Lλ(φ, P) =
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i)
(
sθ(i) + rθ(i)
∑
j,i λ −
∑
j,i λrθ( j)
)
+
∑
i∈[n] P(i)
(∑
j,i λ − 1
)
=
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i)
(
sθ(i) + rθ(i)(n − 1)λ − λ
∑
j,i rθ( j)
)
+
∑
i∈[n] P(i) ((n − 1)λ − 1)
=
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i) (sθ(i) + nλrθ(i)) +
∑
i∈[n] P(i) ((n − 1)λ − 1) −
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i)λ
∑
j∈[n] rθ( j)
=
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i) (sθ(i) + nλrθ(i)) +
∑
i∈[n] P(i) ((n − 1)λ − 1) − λC,
Where we have defined C =
∑
θ∈Θ µθφθ
∑
j∈[n] rθ( j). It is now easy to see that the signaling scheme maxi-
mizing Lλ necessarily on every state of nature θ recommends an action maximizing sθ(i) + nλrθ(i). 
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4 Illustrative Examples
Here, we work through two illustrative examples to highlight the role of different payment models in
Bayesian persuasion. Our examples shed some insights on the payment choices. We formalize these in-
sights in the later sections.
4.1 A tempting but false argument
Initially, it may seem that the optimal scheme with arbitrary payments must recommend an action in
argmaxi{sθ(i)+ rθ(i)} for all θ ∈ Θ (and pay the optimal payments). In fact, the following argument seems to
confirm this intuition. Consider an optimal persuasive signaling scheme φ and assume (towards a contradic-
tion) that there is some state of nature θwhere φ does not recommend an element of argmaxi{sθ(i)+rθ(i)}. Let
j denote the action recommended, and i denote an element in the argmax. Modify φ by moving all the proba-
bility mass from φθ( j) to φθ(i), i.e. recommend action i in state θ, and increase P(i) by µθ ·φθ( j)·(rθ( j)−rθ(i)).
Let φ′ be the new signaling scheme. The following two observations are immediate. First, the sender’s pay-
off under φ′ is strictly larger than the sender’s payoff under φ. This is because the sender pays an additional
µθφθ( j)(rθ( j) − rθ(i)), and gets additional payoff µθφθ( j)(sθ(i) − sθ( j)); the total change in sender payoff is
µθφθ( j) (sθ(i) + rθ(i) − sθ( j) − rθ( j)) > 0, by the hypothesis about action i. Second, the receiver’s payoff
under φ′ is equal to the receiver’s payoff under φ. The receiver gets an additional µθφθ( j)(rθ( j) − rθ(i)) in
payment, and gets additional payoff µθφθ( j)(rθ(i) − rθ( j)). Note that one of these terms might be negative.
Therefore, the sender’s payoff in φ′ is strictly improved, while the receiver is just as happy, i.e., it
seems like we have reached a contradiction to the optimality of φ. The catch is that φ′ is not necessarily
persuasive! Since payments in Bayesian persuasion are quite different than payments in (say) auctions, we
find it educational to present here a concrete example that confirms that the scheme described is suboptimal.8
Consider the following. There are two actions, A and B. Each action gives the receiver payoff 0 or
1, uniform and iid. Identically for the sender payoff. In other words, there are four possible action types
(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1), encoding the receiver and sender payoffs respectively. We will compare the
following two schemes: (1) Recommend a uniformly random action in argmaxi{sθ(i) + rθ(i)}, and pay the
optimal payments (the scheme suggested above), (2) Recommend a uniformly random action that maximizes
sθ(i) + 2rθ(i), and pay the optimal payments (the optimal scheme, as suggested by Proposition 4).
Towards analyzing the first scheme, observe that conditioned on action A having type (1, 1), it is rec-
ommended with probability 7/8: it is always recommended unless B has type (1, 1), in which case it is
recommended with probability 1/2. Conditioned on action A having type (0, 1) or (1, 0), it is recommended
with probability 1/2, and conditioned on having type (0, 0) it is recommended with probability 1/8. The
expected receiver payoff for taking the recommendation, conditioned on action A being recommended, is
(7/8 + 1/2 + 0+ 0)/2 = 11/16. The expected receiver payoff for taking action B when A was recommended
is 5/16. Therefore, the optimal payments are −6/16 for each action. The sender’s expected payoff when the
recommendation is followed is also 11/16, so the total sender utility (accounting for payments) is 17/16.
Let’s analyze the second scheme. The difference between the two schemes is that the second one tie-
breaks in favor of (0, 1) over (1, 0). So, conditioned on action A having type (1, 1), it’s still recommended
with probability 7/8. Conditioned on having type (0, 1), it’s recommended with probability 5/8, type (1, 0)
is recommended with probability 3/8, and type (0, 0) is recommended with probability 1/8. The expected
receiver payoff, conditioned on action A being recommended, is now (7/8 + 5/8 + 0 + 0)/2 = 3/4. The
expected payoff for taking action B when A was recommended is then 1/4. This means that the optimal
payments are −1/2 for each action. The sender’s expected payoff when the recommendation is followed is
(7/8 + 0 + 3/8 + 0)/2 = 5/8. The sender’s total utility is 9/8, indeed better than 17/16.
8The proofs of our theorems of course provide confirmation themselves, but since the intuition is especially jarring for those
unfamiliar with Bayesian persuasion, the example should be instructive.
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4.2 Contrasting payment schemes
The following example demonstrates how negative payments can be quite counterintuitive in Bayesian per-
suasion, and how various constraints on payments differ. Consider an instance with one sender and one
receiver that has two possible actions 0 and 1. Suppose that Θ = {0, 1}, that the two states are equiprob-
able, and that the payoff functions of the sender and the receiver satisfy: sθ(0) = −rθ(0) = 1 − θ and
sθ(1) = −rθ(1) = 1 + θ. The payoffs of the sender and the receiver always sum up to zero, so this is a
zero-sum persuasion game.
The optimal signaling without payments is to not reveal any information to the receiver. To see this,
observe that the receiver must get payoff at least −1/2, as they can guarantee this by ignoring the sender’s
signal and taking action 0. Thus, the sender cannot get utility strictly bigger than 1/2, which they can
guarantee by recommending action 0. This scheme is in fact optimal even when the sender is allowed to
use non-negative payments. To see this, observe that the receiver’s utility is again at least −1/2: they can
always take action 0 regardless of the recommendation, and be paid a non-negative amount. Again, the
sender cannot get utility strictly bigger than 1/2.
Next, consider the following scheme with negative payments, as suggested by Proposition 4: always
recommend action 0 and charge 1. This scheme is persuasive, because the receiver’s expected payoff for
taking action 1 is −3/2. This gives the sender expected utility equal to 3/2.
Finally, consider the following budget balanced scheme, recommended by Proposition 7. When θ = 1,
recommend action 1 with probability q. When θ = 0, recommend action 0 deterministically. The receiver
payoff for taking action 1, conditioned on it being recommended, is −2. The receiver payoff for taking action
0, conditioned on 1 being recommended, is 0. Therefore, the sender must pay 2 to make this persuasive, for
an expected total payment of 2 ·q ·1/2 = q. Conditioned on action 0 being recommended, the receiver payoff
for taking action 0 is (−0.5)/(1− q/2), while her payoff for taking action 1 is (−0.5− (1− q))/(1− q/2). The
sender can charge (1 − q)/(1 − q/2) and remain persuasive, for a total expected charge of 1 − q. The total
sender payoff (not counting payments) is then 2 · q · 1/2 + 0 · (1 − q) · 1/2 + 1 · 1/2 = q + 1/2. Accounting
for payments, the sender pays q, and charges (1 − q), for an additional payoff of 1 − 2q. The sender’s total
utility is 3/2− q. If q = 0, we recover the optimal scheme with possibly negative payments. If q = 1/2, then
the total expected payment is 0, and the scheme is budget balanced. In this case, the expected sender utility
is 1, strictly bigger than the optimal expected utility with non-negative payments.
The above example highlights the following concepts. First, the purpose of negative payments is to get
extra payoff out of “strictly persuasive” schemes. Second, depending on the context, negative payments
might not always be well motivated. For example, if the setup is such that a sender is making a non-binding
recommendation to a receiver, then in the above examples the receiver would simply choose not to engage
in the recommendation and always take action 0. On the other hand, if the sender acts as a “gatekeeper”
to the actions, e.g. because the actions are which event to attend that the sender is hosting or which fund
to invest in that the sender manages, then negative payments are well motivated. Third, all three payment
methods considered in this paper are distinct.
5 Symmetric Actions and No Payments
Here, we consider the standard symmetric setting without payments. We show how to derive structure on the
optimal scheme by making use of duality. In any symmetric instance of Bayesian persuasion, there exists
an optimal dual solution λ∗(i, j) such that λ∗(i, j) = λ∗ ≥ 0 for all i , j by applying Proposition 2. Now, by
plugging directly into Corollary 1 and observing that P(i) = 0 for all i, we get that the Lagrangian for the
optimal dual takes the following form:
Lλ(φ) =
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n]
µθφθ(i) (sθ(i) + nλrθ(i)) − λC. (3)
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We immediately conclude that the optimal scheme recommends, for every state θ, an action maximizing
sθ(i) + nλ
∗rθ(i). With a little more work, we can conclude something stronger about the exact value of λ
∗.
Definition 4 (λ-scaled welfare maximizer). For a given multiplier λ, define φλ to be the scheme with φλ
θ
(i) =
0 if i < argmax j{sθ( j) + nλrθ( j)}, and φ
λ
θ
(i) = 1/|{argmax j{sθ( j) + nλrθ( j)}| if i ∈ argmax j{sθ( j) + nλrθ( j)}.
In other words, φλ recommends a uniformly random action in argmax j{sθ( j) + nλrθ( j)}.
Proposition 3. Let λ∗ be the smallest λ ≥ 0 such that the scheme φλ is persuasive for µθ. Then φ
λ∗ is the
optimal scheme for µθ.
Proof. The proof will follow from the following. We claim that the persuasiveness of φλ is monotone
increasing in λ (larger λ is more persuasive), while the sender payoff is monotone decreasing in λ. Together
this immediately concludes that the optimal persuasive scheme is φλ
∗
. We’ll first need a technical lemma.
Lemma 1. Let φ1, φ2 be symmetric schemes and let µθ be symmetric. Let the expected receiver payoff
for accepting recommendation φ1 for µθ be at least as large as the expected receiver payoff for accepting
recommendation φ2 for µθ. Then if φ
2 is persuasive, so is φ1.9
Proof. First, observe that by symmetry, the expected payoff for any action conditioned on that action being
recommended is the same. Moreover, the expected payoff for any action i conditioned on action j , i being
recommended is also the same (for all i , j). Therefore, the scheme is persuasive as long as for all actions,
the expected payoff conditioned on being recommended exceeds the expected payoff conditioned on not be-
ing recommended. This holds if and only if the expected payoff conditioned on being recommended exceeds
the unconditional expected payoff. As the unconditional expected payoff for an action is independent of the
payoff scheme (denote it by C), we conclude that a signaling scheme is persuasive if and only if the expected
receiver payoff for following the recommendation exceeds C. The lemma immediately follows. 
Lemma 2. If φλ is persuasive, then φλ+δ is persuasive, for all δ ≥ 0.
Proof. First, observe that φλ is symmetric for all λ. Further observe that the receiver’s expected payoff
for following the recommendation is monotone in λ: On every state of nature θ, the recommended action
maximizes sθ(i) + nλrθ(i). The proof now immediately follows by Lemma 1. 
Lemma 3. The sender’s expected payoff when the receiver follows φλ is monotone non-increasing in λ.
Proof. Simply observe that on every state of nature θ, the recommended action maximizes sθ(i) + nλrθ(i).
As λ increases, the sender payoff for the recommended action decreases. 
The proof of Proposition 3 now immediately follows. 
6 Optimal Single Agent Signaling with Payments
In this section we study the single receiver Bayesian persuasion game with payments. While we consider
our “main results” to be the case where payments are constrained to be non-negative, it’s instructive to study
general (positive or negative) payments. We characterize the optimal signaling scheme with payments in
the general setting, drawing similar conclusions to Cai et al. [2016] for optimal auctions. This is not a main
result, but may be of independent interest. An easy corollary of this characterization, however, immediately
allows us to claim something interesting in the case of two actions. The optimal scheme, for all states θ,
recommends the action i maximizing sθ(i) + 2rθ(i) (paying the optimal payments), and this holds for any
distribution.
9 Note that this does not hold generally, and absolutely requires the symmetry assumptions.
10
A deeper application of this characterization lets us characterize the optimal scheme for a single receiver
with n symmetric actions. In this setting, we show that the optimal scheme recommends the action i max-
imizing sθ(i) +
n
n−1
rθ(i) (paying the optimal payments).
10 When payments are non-negative, we prove that
the optimal scheme is always either the optimal scheme without payments at all, or the optimal scheme with
arbitrary payments.
6.1 The general setting with payments
Recall Equation 1, where we had the Langrangian function for an arbitrary polytope P:
Lλ(φ, P) =
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i)
(
sθ(i) + rθ(i)
∑
j,i λ(i, j) −
∑
j,i λ(i, j)rθ( j)
)
+
∑
i∈[n] P(i)
(∑
j,i λ(i, j) − 1
)
.
Also recall that for every choice λ of the Lagrange multipliers, maxφ,PLλ(φ, P) is an upper bound to the
performance of the optimal persuasive scheme. Strong duality further implies that this bound is tight for
some choice of the Lagrange multipliers.
Observe that if payments are allowed to be arbitrary, then maxφ,PLλ(φ, P) is unbounded whenever the
coefficient for P(i) is non-zero for any i (as we can simply set P(i) to be +∞ or −∞. Therefore, we certainly
have
∑
j,i λ(i, j) = 1 in the optimal dual, for all actions i. This means that for each action i, the dual variables
λ(i, .) form a distribution over actions other than i. The simplified Lagrangian becomes
Lλ(φ, P) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈[n]
µθφθ(i)
(
sθ(i) + rθ(i) − E j∼λ(i,.)[rθ( j)]
)
.
For every choice of Lagrange multipliers λ(i, j), the scheme φ that maximizes Lλ(φ, P) recommends, for
every state of nature θ, the action that maximizes sθ(i) + rθ(i) − E j∼λ(i,.)[rθ( j)].
Observation 3. The optimal persuasive scheme φ recommends, at each state of nature θ, the action that
maximizes sθ(i) + rθ(i) − E j∼λ∗(i,.)[rθ( j)], where λ
∗ is the optimal Lagrange multiplier.
Observation 3 provides a general framework to reason about optimal signaling schemes with arbitrary
payments. We repeat now a connection to optimal auction design: In optimal auction design, there are
some cases where the optimal dual is “canonical,” and doesn’t depend on the input distribution (e.g. single-
dimensional) [Myerson, 1981]. In such settings, one can identify simple structure of the optimal mechanism.
The case is similar in signaling: some cases admit a canonical optimal dual that doesn’t depend on the input
distribution. In these cases, we obtain simple characterizations of the optimal scheme.
6.2 Two actions, arbitrary payments
In the n = 2 case of only two actions, Observation 3 immediately allows us to derive the simple structure of
the optimal signaling scheme.
Proposition 4. When n = 2, for every distribution µθ, the optimal persuasive scheme with possibly negative
payments always recommends the action i that maximizes sθ(i) + 2rθ(i) (and pays the optimal payments).
Proof. Observe that there are only two Lagrange multipliers, λ(0, 1) and λ(1, 0), and are both equal to 1 in
the optimal dual (by Observation 3). Therefore, the Lagrangian can be further simplified:
Lλ(φ, P) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈[2] µθφθ(i)
(
sθ(i) + rθ(i) −
∑
j,i rθ( j)
)
=
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈[2] µθφθ(i)
(
sθ(i) + 2rθ(i) −
∑
j∈[2] rθ( j)
)
.
Observe that the term
∑
j∈[2] rθ( j) does not depend on the action selected at all. So in order to maximize
Lλ(φ, P), the scheme must recommend the action maximizing sθ(i) + 2rθ(i) for every state of nature θ. 
10 Further recall that the sender/receiver payoffs for action i are completely determined by action i’s type. So this can also be
phrased as recommending a uniformly random action with type k, where k maximizes ξk +
n
n−1
ρk over all present types k.
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6.3 Symmetric actions
Here, we draw conclusions for the symmetric setting with payments. Again getting initial traction from a
canonical form for the optimal dual. Recall by Corollary 1, the Lagrangian in this setting is given by:
Lλ(φ, P) =
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i) (sθ(i) + nλrθ(i)) +
∑
i∈[n] P(i) ((n − 1)λ − 1) − λC.
Arbitrary payments
When arbitrary payments are allowed, i.e. P = R, then the multiplier (n − 1)λ − 1 of the payment variable
P(i) must be equal to zero for all i. Otherwise the Lagrangian would be unbounded. This immediately
implies that for the optimal dual, we have λ = 1
n−1
, and the Lagrangian becomes
Lλ(φ, P) =
∑
θ∈Θ,i∈[n] µθφθ(i)
(
sθ(i) +
n
n−1
rθ(i)
)
− 1
n−1
C.
The proof of the following proposition then immediately follows.
Proposition 5. In the single sender, single receiver setting with symmetric actions and arbitrary payments,
the optimal scheme recommends, on every state of nature θ, the action i that maximizes sθ(i)+
n
n−1
rθ(i) (and
pays the optimal payments).
Non-negative payments: a dichotomy
When payments are restricted to be non-negative, it is no longer the case that λ is pinned down completely
(in particular, λmust certainly be ≤ 1
n−1
, or else setting P(i) = +∞would result in an unbounded Lagrangian,
but it is indeed possible to have λ < 1
n−1
). Our next result shows that the optimal scheme in this scenario is
essentially either the optimal scheme without any payments, or the optimal scheme for arbitrary payments
(because the payments are already non-negative)
Proposition 6. In the single sender, single receiver setting with independent and identically distributed
actions and non-negative payments, the optimal scheme is either (1) the optimal no-payment scheme, or (2)
recommends the action i that maximizes sθ(i) +
n
n−1
rθ(i) (and pays the optimal non-negative payments).
Proof. Let λ∗ ∈ [0, 1
n−1
] be the λ guaranteed by Corollary 1. Then there is an optimal scheme (φ∗, P∗) that
maximizes Lλ∗(φ, P) over all feasible (φ, P).
If λ∗ < 1
n−1
, then (n−1)λ∗ −1 is strictly negative, and hence the multiplier of each payment variable P(i)
is strictly negative. Therefore, every scheme that maximizes Lλ∗(φ, P) must have P(i) = 0 for all actions i.
Hence, the scheme φ is in fact feasible and persuasive for the no-payments case, and must be the optimal
scheme without payments (as every scheme without payments is also feasible for non-negative payments,
and φ is optimal among all schemes with non-negative payments).
If λ∗ = 1
n−1
, then we immediately observe that this is exactly the same Lagrangian as for arbitrary
payments, and therefore the second part of the proposition follows. 
7 Optimal Multi-agent Signaling with Externalities and Payments
In this section, we study Bayesian persuasion for multiple receivers with binary actions and general ex-
ternalities through the lens of duality. Our model is a natural extension of the model recently introduced
in Arieli and Babichenko [2019], and further developed in Dughmi and Xu [2017]. We refer the reader to
Section 2 for notation and definitions. Missing proofs can be found in Appendix A. In Appendix B we study
optimal signaling with positive externalities: when no payments are allowed, and sender and receiver utility
functions lie in some cone of set functions C, we use duality to exhibit a polynomial time reduction from
optimal signaling to the optimization problem for set functions in C.
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7.1 Linear programming formulation
Similar to all other Bayesian persuasion problems, one can formulate finding the optimal signaling scheme
with payments as a linear program, but this time with exponentially many variables (again, P is the set of
feasible payments):
max
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
S⊆[N] µθφθ(S )
(
f θ(S ) +
∑
i∈S p
(i)(1) +
∑
i<S p
(i)(0)
)
(LP-Binary)∑
θ∈Θ µθ
∑
S ∋i φθ(S )
(
uθ
i
(S ) + p(i)(1)
)
≥
∑
θ∈Θ µθ
∑
S ∋i φθ(S )u
θ
i
(S \ {i}), ∀i ∈ [N],∑
θ∈Θ µθ
∑
S =i φθ(S )
(
uθ
i
(S ) + p(i)(0)
)
≥
∑
θ∈Θ µθ
∑
S =i φθ(S )u
θ
i
(S ∪ {i}), ∀i ∈ [N]∑
S⊆[N] φθ(S ) = 1, ∀θ ∈ Θ φθ(S ) ≥ 0,∀S ⊆ [N], θ ∈ Θ
{p(i)(a)}i∈[N],a∈{0,1} ∈ P
The first two sets of constraints in this LP are essentially persuasion constraints, i.e. if a receiver is in
the recommended set S she is better off picking action 1 and if a receiver is not in the recommended set S
she is better off picking action 0. For notation brevity, we rewrite the persuasiveness constraints as:
(∗)
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S ∋i
φθ(S )
(
gθi (S ) + p
(i)(1)
)
≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [N]
(∗∗)
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S =i
φθ(S )
(
gθi (S ∪ {i}) − p
(i)(0)
)
≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [N]
where gθ
i
(S ) , uθ
i
(S ) − uθ
i
(S \ {i}). Note that gθ
i
(S ) = 0 for i < S .
7.2 Budget balanced payments under externalities
As explored in Section 6, adding monetary payments to the signaling problem, whether payments are posi-
tive or negative, is a natural idea to boost the performance of signaling schemes. It is expected that by adding
arbitrary payments, one can increase the expected sender’s utility, as we have seen in Section 4.2; however,
it is not clear what happens if we allow restricted payments, e.g. payments that are budget-balanced. A gen-
eral and mathematically interesting setting to study this question is the general multi-agent signaling with
externalities. We seek to find a simple characterization for the optimal scheme, and understand its properties.
In the same setting, we also study arbitrary payments and show how one can modify the previous budget
balanced scheme to find the optimal scheme with arbitrary payments. This model is again mathematically
interesting, but perhaps not as natural as the budget-balanced.
Here is the surprising upshot of the story: with the help of Lagrangian duality we can design signaling
schemes with payments that have a simple form (in contrast to the optimal scheme without payments), are
budget-balanced in expectation (i.e. zero total payment in expectation), and sender’s expected payoff 11 is no
smaller than that of the optimal signaling without payments. Also, as we explained in Section 4.2, somewhat
surprisingly, it is possible that the sender’s expected utility strictly increases by a budget-balanced scheme.
Definition 5. A budget-balanced signaling scheme for the multi-agent binary-actions with externalities
setting is a pair of an allocation rule {φθ(S )}S⊆[N] and a payment rule {p
(i)(a)}i∈[N],a∈{0,1} satisfying:
∀θ ∈ Θ :
∑
S⊆[N]
φθ(S ) = 1, ∀S ⊆ [N], θ ∈ Θ : φθ(S ) ≥ 0 [feasibility]
∑
i∈[N]
∑
θ∈Θ

∑
S ∋i
µθφθ(S )p
(i)(1) +
∑
S =i
µθφθ(S )p
(i)(0)
 = 0, [budget-balance]
where p(i)(a) is the payment to receiver i in state θ, when the receiver takes action a.
11 When the scheme is budget-balanced, there is no difference between expected utility and expected payoff of the sender.
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Proposition 7 (Optimal budget-balanced signaling with externalities). In multi-agent binary-action with
externalities setting, there exists a persuasive signaling scheme such that:
1. It is budget-balanced as in Definition 5 (but may charge negative payments),
2. It maximizes the “total virtual payoff". That is, there exists a parameter γ∗ ≥ 0 such that for every
state of nature θ the scheme recommends action 1 to a subset of agents S ∗θ that maximizes f
θ(S ) +
γ∗
(∑
i∈S g
θ
i
(S ) −
∑
i<S g
θ
i
(S ∪ {i})
)
, where gθ
i
(S ) = uθ
i
(S ) − uθ
i
(S \ {i}),
3. The expected total payoff of the sender is no smaller than the expected total payoff of the sender under
any budget-balance persuasive scheme (with or without payments).
One can show a similar characterization for the optimal signaling scheme with arbitrary payments.
In fact, because the payments are now unrestricted, the corresponding dual constraints are going to be
equalities. This fact results in the following generalization of Proposition 4 for the special case of N = 1.
Proposition 8 (Optimal signaling with externalities and arbitrary payments). In the multi-agent binary-
action with externalities setting, the optimal signaling scheme with arbitrary payments maximizes the total
payoff, i.e. for every state θ the scheme recommends action 1 to a subset of agents S ∗θ that maximizes
f θ(S ) +
(∑
i∈S g
θ
i
(S ) −
∑
i<S g
θ
i
(S ∪ {i})
)
, where gθ
i
(S ) = uθ
i
(S ) − uθ
i
(S \ {i}).
8 Conclusion
We augment Bayesian persuasion by introducing payments, in single and multi-receiver settings. We obtain
a number of results, all enabled via Lagrangian duality. For symmetric, single-receiver persuasion with no
payments we show that a detail-free, ex-post Pareto optimal scheme is optimal. In the same setting, if arbi-
trary payments are allowed, the optimal scheme does not even depend on the prior: it always recommends
the action that maximizes the sender utility plus n
n−1
times the receiver utility, where n is the number of
actions. When payments are restricted to be non-negative we prove a dichotomy: the optimal scheme is
either the arbitrary-payment signaling scheme or the optimal no-payment scheme. When there are multiple
receivers with binary actions and externalities, we prove that a simple scheme is optimal under a budget
balanced constraint on the payments. Finally, in the same setting, when no payments are allowed, when the
sender and receiver utility functions lie in some cone of set functions C, we use duality to give a polynomial
time reduction from optimal signaling to the optimization problem for set functions in C.
Our work focuses on characterizing optimal schemes in the simplest cases beyond the tools of prior
work. Notably, our tools gain the most traction where there is a “canonical” optimal dual (i.e. when the
optimal Lagrangian multipliers are independent of the underlying distribution). Compare this to single-
dimensional settings in auction design where the payment identity/monotonicity implies a canonical optimal
dual as well Myerson [1981].
The clear direction for future work is to consider more general settings, possibly through the lens of
“simple versus optimal” persuasion schemes (aligned with similar work in mechanism design). That is,
rather than targeting optimal dual solutions (which are likely unwieldy too far beyond the canonical set-
tings studied her), perhaps approximately optimal dual solutions will yield tractable insight for proving
approximation results. Results of this form are limited without making use of duality, but do exist. For
example, Dughmi and Xu [2016] provides an even simpler signaling scheme for a single receiver with a
symmetric prior that guarantees a (1 − 1/e)-approximation. Another general direction for future work is to
further explore the interplay between payments and persuasion.
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A Missing proofs.
Proof of Proposition 2. Now, consider any optimal, persuasive signaling scheme (φ, p), and any optimal
dual λ. For a permutation π : [n] → [n], let π(θ) denote the state of nature [θπ(1), . . . , θπ(n)], π(p) denote
the prices p(π−1(1)), . . . , p(π−1(n)). Let π(λ) denote the dual variables with π(λ)(i, j) = λ(π−1(i), π−1( j)).
Finally, let π(φ) denote the signaling scheme that on state of nature θ, recommends action i with probability
φπ(θ)(π
−1(i)).
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Now we just want to confirm that (π(φ), π(P)) and π(λ) form another optimal primal/dual pair for any
permutation π (because µθ is symmetric). Let’s first compute the probability that π(φ) recommends ac-
tion π(i). By symmetry of µθ, the states θ and π
−1(θ) occur with the same probability. On state θ, φ rec-
ommends action i with probability φθ(i). On state π
−1(θ), π(φ) recommends action π(i) with probability
φπ(π−1(θ))(π
−1(π(i))) = φθ(i) (this is just chasing through the definition of π(φ)). Therefore, because θ and
π−1(θ) occur with the same probability, π(φ) recommends action π(i) with the same probability φ recom-
mends action i. This immediately means that the total payment made in φ and π(φ) is identical because
(φ, p) pays p(i) whenever φ recommends action i, and (π(φ), π(p)) pays p(π−1(π(i))) = p(i) whenever π(φ)
recommends action π(i), and these two probabilities are the same for all i.
Now we also want to claim that the above calculations show that the sender reward is identical under φ
and π(φ) (assuming the receiver takes the recommended action). To see this, observe again that if we couple
the events where the state of nature θ is drawn for φ, and state π−1(θ) is drawn for π(φ), then φ recommends
action i with type θi with probability φθ(i), and π(φ) recommends action π(i) with type θπ−1(π(i)) = θi with
probability φθ(i). So in fact for every state of nature, the expected sender reward on state θ under φ is the
same as the expected sender reward on state π−1(θ) under π(φ).
Next, we want to claim that the receiver’s expected payoff for taking action π( j) when π(i) is recom-
mended by π(φ) is exactly the same as their expected payoff for taking action j when i is recommended by
φ. We can write the expected payoff for taking action j when i is recommended (times the probability that i
is recommended by φ) as: ∑
θ
µθφθ(i)rθ( j) =
∑
θ
µθπ(φ)π−1(θ)(π(i))rπ(θ)(π( j)).
The RHS now computes exactly the expected payoff for taking action π( j) when π(i) is recommended (times
the probability that π(i) is recommended by π(φ)). So if φ is persuasive, then π(φ) is persuasive as well.
Finally, we want to claim that for the dual solution π(λ), (π(φ), P) is optimal and satisfies comple-
mentary slackness. First, observe by the work above that the expected reward for the receiver for taking
action j when i is recommended by φ is exactly the same as the expected reward for receiver for taking
action π( j) when π(i) is recommended by π(φ). Combined with the fact that λ(i, j) > 0 ⇒ the receiver
is indifferent between following the recommendation and taking action j when φ recommends i, and that
π(λ)(π(i), π( j)) = λ(π(π−1(i)), π(π−1( j))) = λ(i, j), we immediately conclude that π(λ)(π(i), π( j)) > 0 ⇒ the
receiver is indifferent between following the recommendation and taking action π( j) when π(φ) recommends
π(i). So complementary slackness is satisfied. Finally, observe that:
r
π(λ)
π−1(θ)
(π(i)) =
∑
j,i
π(λ)(π(i), π( j)) · (rπ−1(θ)(π(i)) − rπ−1(θ)(π( j))) =
∑
j,i
λ(i, j) · (rθ(i) − rθ( j)) = r
λ
θ (i)
So if on state θ, i maximizes sθ(i)+ r
λ
θ
(i), then on state π−1(θ), π(i) maximizes sθ(π(i))+ r
π(λ)
π−1(θ)
(π(i)), and
π(φ) is indeed optimal for the Lagrangian problem induced by dual solution π(λ). All together, this shows
that (π(φ), π(P)) is still persuasive and optimal, as is the dual π(λ). We conclude by observing that the scheme
that samples π uniformly at random and then implements (π(φ), π(P)) is therefore optimal and persuasive,
as is the dual that averages π(λ) over all π. It is easy to see that both primal and dual are symmetric as per
the definitions. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Similar to (LP-Binary), we find the optimal scheme with payments through linear
programming. We add the budget-balance constraint to the previous program. The optimal signaling scheme
satisfying Definition 5 is the solution of this LP:
max
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
S⊆[N]
µθφθ(S ) f
θ(S ) (LP-Budget-Balanced-1)
17
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S ∋i
φθ(S )(u
θ
i (S ) + p
(i)(1)) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S ∋i
φθ(S )u
θ
i (S \ {i}), ∀i ∈ [N],
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S =i
φθ(S )(u
θ
i (S ) + p
(i)(0)) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S =i
φθ(S )u
θ
i (S ∪ {i}), ∀i ∈ [N]
∑
i∈[N]
∑
θ∈Θ

∑
S ∋i
µθφθ(S )p
(i)(1) +
∑
S =i
µθφθ(S )p
(i)(0)
 = 0
∑
S⊆[N]
φθ(S ) = 1, ∀θ ∈ Θ φθ(S ) ≥ 0,∀S ⊆ [N], θ ∈ Θ
For a given signaling scheme {φθ(S ), p
(i)(.)}, we introduce new variables Qi(1) and Qi(0) to be equal to
the expected payment of agent i for actions 1 and 0 respectively, where the expectation is taken over the
randomness in the nature and the scheme, i.e.,
Qi(1) ,
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
S ∋i
µθφθ(S )p
(i)(1) , Qi(0) ,
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
S =i
µθφθ(S )p
(i)(0) (4)
We then simplify (LP-Budget-Balanced-1) by rewriting it with variables {φθ(S ),Qi(.)}, i.e.,
max
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
S⊆[N]
µθφθ(S ) f
θ(S ) (LP-Budget-Balanced-2)
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S ∋i
φθ(S )u
θ
i (S ) + Qi(1) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S ∋i
φθ(S )u
θ
i (S \ {i}), ∀i ∈ [N] (5)
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S =i
φθ(S )u
θ
i (S ) + Qi(0) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S =i
φθ(S )u
θ
i (S ∪ {i}), ∀i ∈ [N] (6)
∑
i∈[N]
(Qi(1) + Qi(0)) = 0 (7)
∑
S⊆[N]
φθ(S ) = 1, ∀θ ∈ Θ φθ(S ) ≥ 0,∀S ⊆ [N], θ ∈ Θ (8)
To reveal the structure of the optimal scheme, we use the method of Lagrangian multipliers, á la Section 5,
and move the group of constraints 5, 6 and 7 using dual variables {αi},{βi} and γ to the objective respectively.
By rearranging the terms, this partial Lagrangian function L will be equal to
Lα,β,γ (φ,Q(1),Q(0)) = Eθ

∑
S
φθ(S ) f
θ(S )

+ Eθ

∑
i
αi
∑
S ∋i
φθ(S )g
θ
i (S )
 − Eθ

∑
i
βi
∑
S =i
φθ(S )g
θ
i (S ∪ {i})

+
∑
i
(γ − αi)Qi(1) +
∑
i
(γ − βi)Qi(0) (9)
Define SN to be the simplex over all subsets of [N]. Strong duality implies that the optimal primal-dual
solutions of (LP-Budget-Balanced-2) are the solutions of the following min-max program:
max
Q(1),Q(0)∈Rn,∀θ:φθ∈SN
(
min
α,β∈Rn+,γ∈R
Lα,β,γ (φ,Q(1),Q(0))
)
= min
α,β∈Rn+,γ∈R
(
max
Q(1),Q(0)∈Rn,∀θ:φθ∈SN
Lα,β,γ (φ,Q(1),Q(0))
)
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By looking at the partial Lagrangian function L in (9), ∀i : α∗
i
= β∗
i
= γ∗, simply because otherwise one can
make Qi(1) (or Qi(0)) converging to either +∞ or −∞ to maximize the objective, and make the objective
unbounded, contradicting the fact that the linear program is bounded. Therefore:
Lα∗,β∗,γ∗ (φ,Q(1),Q(0)) = Eθ

∑
S
φθ(S ) f
θ(S )
 (10)
+ γ∗Eθ

∑
i

∑
S ∋i
φθ(S )g
θ
i (S ) −
∑
S ∋i
φθ(S )g
θ
i (S ∪ {i})


= Eθ

∑
S
φθ(S ) f
θ(S )
 + γ∗Eθ

∑
S

∑
i∈S
φθ(S )g
θ
i (S ) −
∑
i<S
φθ(S )g
θ
i (S ∪ {i})


= Eθ

∑
S
φθ(S )
 f θ(S ) + γ∗

∑
i∈S
gθi (S ) −
∑
i<S
gθi (S ∪ {i})


 (11)
As the optimal signaling scheme φ∗ should maximize 11, therefore for every state θ the scheme should
recommend the set S ∗θ such that
S ∗θ = argmax
S
 f θ(S ) + γ∗

∑
i∈S
gθi (S ) −
∑
i<S
gθi (S ∪ {i})


To compute the payments, let x∗
i
= Pθ
[
i ∈ S ∗θ
]
. Now, to have a payment rule whose expectation is equal to
Q(.), we can define the payments as
p∗(i)(1) =
Qi(1)
x∗
i
· I{i ∈ S ∗θ}, p
∗(i)(0) =
Qi(0)
1 − x∗
i
· I{i < S ∗θ} (12)
Finally, it is clear that any signaling scheme without payments is a feasible solution for (LP-Budget-Balanced-1),
and hence the sender’s expected payoff in the above scheme (i.e. with allocation {S ∗θ} and payments
p∗(1), p∗(0)) is no smaller than the expected payoff of the sender in the optimal scheme without payments,
which completes the proof. 
B Computing optimal signaling with positive externalities
As the LP for binary signaling has exponentially many variables, one might wonder how hard it is to compute
the optimal signaling scheme. In this section, we show a formal reduction from computing the optimal
signaling scheme with positive externalities (and without payments12) to the optimization of a special class
of set functions. Our reduction extends one direction of the reduction in Dughmi and Xu [2017], and uses
techniques similar in spirit to Cai et al. [2012, 2013]; Daskalakis and Weinberg [2015].
The positive externality simply means that an agent switching from action 0 to 1 cannot harm any other
agent. More formally, we have the following property.
Definition 6. A profile of utility functions {uθ
i
(.)} has positive externalities if and only if for every state of
the nature θ ∈ Θ, and for every S ⊆ [N], i ∈ S , and j , i, j ∈ S we have:
gθi (S ) ≥ g
θ
i (S \ { j})
where again, gθ
i
(S ) = uθ
i
(S ) − uθ
i
(S \ {i}).
12For the remaining of the section, we set the payments to be zero.
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We quickly observe that under this property, it is in fact without loss to drop the constraints (**) from
the linear program (LP-Binary) in Section 7.1.
Lemma 4. Suppose P = ~0. Under positive externalities, there exists an optimal solution for the linear
program (LP-Binary) that also solves the same LP without constraints (**).
Proof. Consider any optimal solution to the LP without (**) when P = ~0. If all constraints in (**) happen to
be satisfied anyway, then we’re done. If not, we claim that we can satisfy (**) without harming the quality
of the solution or persuasiveness. Observe that if (**) is not satisfied by some optimal solution {φθ(S )}, then
there exists i, θ, and T such that i ∈ T , gθ
i
(T ) > 0 and φθ(T \ {i}) > 0. Consider modifying {φθ(S )} by moving
all mass from φθ(T \ {i}) to φθ(T ) instead. Observe that:
• This only makes the sender weakly happier, as the sender’s payoff function is monotone.
• This only makes receiver i strictly happier, as we had gθ
i
(T ) > 0.
• If j , i, j ∈ T was recommended action 1, then this recommendation still remains persuasive, due to
the marginal cross-monotonicity property.
• if j , i, j ∈ T was recommended action 0 and this action is not persuasive anymore, modify {φθ(S )}
by recommending action 1 to her instead.
Now, repeat the above process until there is no constraint in (**) violated. This process terminates in finite
time, because once a person is recommended action 1 this recommendation remains persuasive until the
end, and at each iteration we either terminate or make progress by recommending action 1 to least one more
person. Furthermore, this process only makes the sender’s expected payoff higher, completing the proof. 
Applying Lemma 4, the final primal-dual LP (without payments) can be simplified as:
max
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
S⊆[N]
µθφθ(S ) f
θ(S ) min
∑
θ∈Θ
yθ
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ
∑
S ∋i
φθ(S )g
θ
i (S ) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [N] yθ −
∑
i∈S
αig
θ
i (S )µθ ≥ f
θ(S )µθ, ∀S ⊆ [N], θ ∈ Θ
∑
S⊆[N]
φθ(S ) = 1, ∀θ ∈ Θ αi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [N]
φθ(S ) ≥ 0, ∀S ⊆ [N], θ ∈ Θ
We also need to define convex cones over the space of set functions before describing our result.
Definition 7. Any subset C of RΩ, where Ω , 2[N], is a cone if and only if for each set function h ∈ C and
scalar α ∈ R+, α · h ∈ C. Moreover, given set functions f1(.), . . . , fm(.), the conic hull of these functions is
defined as cone( f1, . . . , fm) , { f : 2
[N] → R : f =
∑m
i=1 wi · fi,wi ≥ 0}, which indeed is a cone in R
Ω.
Given these definitions, we formally prove the following proposition.
Proposition 9 (BP with externalities ⇒ Set optimization ). Let C ⊆ RΩ be a cone of set functions, and
suppose there is polynomial time algorithm that returns argmaxS⊆[N] h(S ) for every set function h ∈ C. Then,
there exists a polynomial time algorithm that computes the optimal signaling scheme for every instance of
Bayesian persuasion with externalities satisfying the following:
1. For every state of the nature θ ∈ Θ, f θ ∈ C, gθ
i
∈ C for all i ∈ [N], and
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2. For every state of the nature θ ∈ Θ, f θ is monotone non-decreasing and agents have positive external-
ities as in Definition 6.
Proof. Consider the primal linear program of optimal signaling. By using linear programming duality, solv-
ing the primal LP is reduced to solving its dual. Moreover, because of the equivalence between optimization
and separation, solving the dual program is reduced to finding a separation oracle for the following set of
dual constraints:
yθ −
∑
i∈S
αig
θ
i (S )µθ ≥ f
θ(S )µθ, ∀S ⊆ [N], θ ∈ Θ
Clearly gθ
i
(S ) = uθ
i
(S ) − uθ
i
(S \ {i}) = 0 for i < S , and hence
∑
i∈S αig
θ
i
(S ) =
∑
i∈[N] αig
θ
i
(S ). By di-
viding both sides of the constraint by µθ, the separation problem for every θ ∈ Θ is equivalent to finding
S ∗ = argmaxS⊆[N]
∑
i∈[N] αig
θ
i
(S ) + f θ(S ) for given αi’s. Also, αi ≥ 0, and hence
∑
i∈[N] αig
θ
i
(S ) + f θ(S ) ∈
cone( f θ, gθ
1
, . . . , gθ
N
) ⊆ C. So, given access to the algorithm that solves the set function optimization over C
in polynomial time, we can find S ∗ in polynomial time. Given this separation oracle, we can now solve the
persuasion problem in polynomial time. 
C Reduced forms in i.i.d. signaling
By making use of ideas related to reduced forms in Bayesian auctions and Border’s theorem Border [1991];
Matthews [1984]; Maskin and Riley [1984], we can simplify the LP for the independent setting. These
ideas have already appeared in Dughmi and Xu [2016], but we reproduce them here for completeness. Let
Bθ ∈ {0, 1}n×m be an n by m matrix such that Bθ
i j
= 1 iff θi = j (action i has type j). Define M
i =∑
θ∈Θ µθφθ(i)B
θ, that is Mi
jk
is the joint probability that action j has type k and the scheme outputs action
i. M =
(
M1, . . . ,Mn
)
∈ Rn×m×n is the signature or reduced form of φθ. M is realizable if there exists
a signaling scheme φθ with M as its signature. We write Ps for the polytope of realizable signatures (see
Dughmi and Xu [2016] for more details and properties of these reduced forms). The program for this special
case, using the same change of variables as in the general case, is:
max
∑
i∈[n]
∑
k∈[m]
Miikξ
i
k −
∑
i∈[n]
P(i) (LP-Independent-with-Payments)
P(i) +
∑
k∈[m]
Miikρ
i
k ≥
∑
k∈[m]
Mijkρ
i
k, for i, j , i ∈ [n]
M ∈ Ps, and P ∈ P
While these notations are helpful to identify the computational hardness of signaling problems, as in Dughmi and Xu
[2017, 2016], we never use them in our treatment, and we only mention them here for completeness.
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